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INTRODUCTION
The previous presentations in this
symposium have addressed important
issues concerning how we might respond
to the threat of an influenza pandemic in
humans. I would like to address the topic
of how this and future threats of pandemic
influenza might be avoided through an
understanding of the avian origins of
influenza viral genotypes that have poten-
tial for causing human pandemics. I
believe this is an important topic worthy of
consideration in this symposium on
bioethics, and it is relevant to the subject
of vaccines, as you will see in a moment.
But first, I would like to put things into
perspective regarding the origins of
human disease with pandemic potential.
ZOONOTIC ORIGINS OF HUMAN
DISEASE
In a recent review of all human infec-
tions [1], a total of 1,415 known human
pathogenic agents was compiled from a
thorough search of the medical literature.
The taxonomic groups represented by
these 1,415 human pathogens include
helminths (32 percent), bacteria (including
rickettsia) (31 percent), viruses and prions
(19 percent), fungi (13 percent), and pro-
tozoa (5 percent). Of this total, the major-
ity (868, or 61 percent) are considered to
be zoonotic pathogens. These are
pathogens that we share with other ani-
mals, either directly or through intermedi-
ate hosts such as arthropod vectors. Many
more human pathogens have zoonotic
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Like most emerging disease threats, avian influenza is a zoonotic disease maintained in
nature by wildlife. In this case, the reservoir of infection is migratory waterfowl, primarily
ducks. Rather than trying to vaccinate most of the world’s human population in response
to the threat of an avian influenza pandemic, it might be more prudent to vaccinate key
reservoir wildlife species from which pandemic strains evolve. This strategy would require
a much more intensive research effort to understand the evolution of avian influenza virus-
es in nature, but it would be far less costly than any of the alternatives. Research priorities
for emerging zoonoses, such as new strains of avian influenza viruses, should be re-eval-
uated with an emphasis on ways to intervene at their source, the natural reservoir hosts
from which they originate, rather than focusing upon human-based interventions, which are
too often too late.evolutionary origins, but have since adapt-
ed exclusively to humans with no existing
connection to non-human animal reser-
voirs.
Among these 1,415 known human
pathogens, about 12 percent (175) are
causing what we consider to be emerging
diseases — new diseases — that either we
haven’t seen before or previously were
rare. These include most of the important
diseases that threaten human health today,
and 75 percent (132) of these emerging
pathogens are zoonotic. So, the vast
majority of new disease threats for humans
are from pathogens that we share with
other animals. Interestingly, viruses and
prions dominate this list (44 percent) and
helminthes are relatively rare (6 percent)
compared to the total human pathogens
list.
In reality, the concept of emerging
disease is simply the evolutionary conse-
quences of us sharing pathogens with the
rest of the biological world. Obviously, we
have been accumulating pathogens from
other species throughout our evolutionary
history, and it is likely that this process
will continue and perhaps even accelerate
as the world becomes more crowded and
the environment more degraded [2].
Influenza A viruses, of course, are typical
zoonotic pathogens.
ZOONOTIC ORIGINS OF AVIAN
INFLUENZA
A recent New England Journal of
Medicine editorial [3] describes what the
research priorities should be concerning
avian influenza and the prospects for a
pandemic. These research priorities
include case management, development of
vaccines and studies on vaccine efficacy,
risk assessment, and the management of
risk through intervention in the event of a
human pandemic, and the role of animals.
Unfortunately, this priority list is com-
pletely inverted. The role of animals
should be the highest priority if it is not
already too late to avert a pandemic from
H5N1.The role of animals is of paramount
importance in all zoonotic disease threats
to humans, yet this aspect most often
receives the least attention until it is too
late to prevent an outbreak in humans [4].
As was mentioned in previous talks,
all of the influenza A viruses originate
from wild aquatic birds. Excellent reviews
on the ecology and evolution of influenza
Aviruses are provided byWebster et al. [5,
6]. Phylogenetic evidence from sequence
data suggests that all influenza A geno-
types found in humans, pigs, horses, sea
mammals, and a wide variety of bird
species ultimately originate from migrato-
ry aquatic birds, mostly ducks and, to a
lesser extent, shore birds. As with most
zoonotic agents, reservoir hosts for
influenza A viruses are usually asympto-
matic but can transmit infection readily to
other individuals or other susceptible
species for varying periods of time, usual-
ly about two weeks.
Although influenza A viruses enjoy a
global distribution, the different genotypes
(H and N types) are not distributed evenly
throughout the world as the major migra-
tory bird flyways tend to maintain charac-
teristic genotypes. Most of the viruses
causing epidemics in humans originate in
the East Asian flyway, but outbreaks in
domestic birds (chickens and ducks) and
rarely humans have occurred in other fly-
ways as well. Epizootics in domestic birds
create conditions conducive for transmis-
sion to humans, through increased contact
and genetic adaptation, often through
porcine (pig) intermediates [5, 6].
The potentially pandemic subtype
H5N1 is directly infectious to humans
from domestic birds, although cats are also
susceptible and may be an additional route
of exposure for humans [7]. However, the
H5N1 subtype is also unusual in that it has
recently caused epizootics in wild birds in
Asia which may be contributing to its
spread [8]. It appears to be lethal for wild
birds, which should lessen their reservoir
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from infected wild birds remains to be
determined.
INTERVENTION OPTIONS
All the discussion today has been
focused on how we can prevent an H5N1
pandemic in humans and specifically on
protecting humans from infection. This is
the traditional approach of medical epi-
demiology in the face of a pending epi-
demic. But a more holistic approach to the
problem would be to consider where these
viruses are coming from in nature. What is
the source of these viruses in the natural
environment and what can we do about
preventing them from becoming a threat to
humans? Preemptive action at the level of
wildlife reservoir would seem to be much
more effective and far less costly than
preparing for a human pandemic.
The usual options for intervention at
the reservoir source for zoonotic diseases
involve isolation or culling and possibly
vaccination when domestic animals are
reservoirs. Isolation and culling of domes-
tic birds is currently being done in
Southeast Asia and China, but it is
extremely costly. Estimates of the eco-
nomic loss from H5N1 to the domestic
bird industry in Asia as of April 2005 are
in the range of $10 billion to $15 billion
[9]. The effectiveness of these measures in
averting a human pandemic remains to be
seen. A more cost-effective strategy might
be to explore opportunities to intervene in
the natural maintenance cycles of influen-
za A viruses occurring in wildlife.
Wholesale culling of wildlife should
not be considered an option because its
effectiveness in preventing a human pan-
demic is purely speculative, and the envi-
ronmental consequences would be
extremely severe. However, increased iso-
lation between wildlife and domestic birds
and humans that would decrease opportu-
nities for cross-species transmission might
be accomplished by creating or restoring
natural wetlands in order to aggregate
migratory aquatic birds in more remote
areas. Likewise, domestic bird husbandry
practices might be altered to minimize
contact with wild waterfowl or discourage
their presence. More research into these
wildlife management strategies should be
supported.
VACCINATION OF WILDLIFE
RESERVOIRS
The focus of our discussion today has
been on vaccination, albeit human vacci-
nation, and I would like to introduce the
concept of vaccinating wildlife instead of
humans as an intervention strategy against
zoonotic disease threats, such as influenza
A viruses.
There are certain distinct advantages
in vaccinating wildlife over humans. The
obvious advantages are that you do not
have to get informed consent or FDA
approval, and the patients cannot sue. But
also, there might not be as many individu-
als involved. Instead of trying to vaccinate
billions of people to control a pandemic, it
might be easier to try to vaccinate certain
populations of key wildlife species that are
responsible for the emergence of pandem-
ic genotypes. There are certainly much
fewer of these than there are people, but
we must identify them and get them vacci-
nated. This would require a far greater
knowledge of the evolutionary ecology of
influenza A viruses than we currently
have, but this knowledge probably can be
obtained for a research investment of, say,
$1 billion. This might be an intelligent
investment considering the cost of vacci-
nating humans to prevent pandemics or,
worse yet, not vaccinating humans during
a pandemic. One billion dollars seems
meager considering what is at stake (an
estimated $800 billion in the first year of a
human pandemic [10]).
Vaccination of wildlife reservoirs of
human infections has been successfully
demonstrated with another zoonotic virus
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America, rabies in wild mammal reser-
voirs (fox and raccoon, respectively) has
been dramatically reduced or eliminated
over large geographic areas through oral
vaccination resulting in a significant
decrease or elimination of human disease
risk [11, 12].Although fatal, human rabies
has always been a rare disease in modern
times. Yet considerable effort has been
made to understand its ecology and to
manipulate the prevalence of this virus in
nature. Vaccination of wildlife reservoirs
of rabies has been much more effective
than culling, which had been the previous
practice to manage human risk of infection
from reservoir animals [13].
Rabies is a relatively simple disease
system, however, with one strain of virus
usually being primarily maintained by a
single reservoir host species [14].
Influenza A viruses are much more com-
plex and maintained by many reservoir
host species, which makes identifying an
effective target a seemingly enormous
challenge.
We have tried a wildlife vaccination
approach with Lyme disease here in
Connecticut. Like influenza A virus, the
spirochetal agent of Lyme disease is genet-
ically variable and is maintained by a large
variety of vertebrate hosts, including both
birds and mammals [15]. However, some
reservoir species are much more important
than others, and the white-footed mouse,
perhaps the most common mammalian
resident of northeastern forests, is thought
to be the most important source of infec-
tion for humans. In the case of Lyme dis-
ease, ticks provide the means of transmis-
sion between reservoir host and humans,
so direct contact with the reservoir host is
not necessary. We reasoned that by vacci-
nating mice, there would be fewer infected
ticks available in the environment to bite
humans, and the risk of human disease
would be reduced.
More than 1,000 mice were vaccinat-
ed over three years in a large field study
near New Haven. Before developing an
oral vaccine, we decided to do our prelim-
inary study the old-fashioned way, by trap-
ping and vaccinating individual mice with
a syringe. The details can be found in our
recently published paper [16], but the
basic results were that we did find a reduc-
tion in the prevalence of infection in ticks
occurring in the vaccination plots, vs. plots
in which the mice were given a placebo
injection. The reduction was not great,
only 17 percent, but it did demonstrate that
wildlife vaccination could reduce human
disease risk for a vector-borne zoonotic
disease. We may have overestimated the
role of mice as a reservoir species, which
demonstrates the need for understanding
the ecology of zoonotic pathogens in their
natural environment.
Ironically, the vaccine we used on
mice was originally developed for
humans. The human vaccine is no longer
on the market because of liability issues
[17]. Again, this was not an issue for the
mice, and our mouse vaccination project
did not require the approximate $100 mil-
lion that was invested in clinical trials for
the human Lyme disease vaccine [18].
ECOLOGY OF AVIAN INFLUENZA
What are the key ecological questions
we need to ask in order to explore the
potential for a wildlife intervention strategy
against pandemic influenza A viruses? We
need to know what is the distribution of the
various subtypes among different avian
species. It is not likely that all viral geno-
types do equally well in all avian species.
What is the pattern of the distribution of
subtypes within a species? Presumably not
all individuals are equally susceptible or
equally infectious to others. What is the
nature and outcome of interactions between
viral subtypes within individual birds.
Pathogens in nature do not usually occur in
isolation, and competition and cross immu-
nity are important in regulating interac-
tions. And finally, what subtypes are most
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genotypes for humans? A review of the lit-
erature reveals the fact that we do not know
very much about the ecology of these
viruses in nature. There are surprisingly
few papers, and they are scattered among
journals of many different disciplines,
including wildlife diseases, ornithology,
virology, and infectious diseases.
I have not conducted an exhaustive
review of the literature, but I have found a
few studies that begin to provide some
answers to the key ecological questions
posed.Arecent study on influenzaAvirus-
es in migratory North American water
birds [19] found that there are consistently
more H subtypes in shore birds than in
wild ducks. Also, the distribution of N
types varies between shore birds and wild
ducks, with some N types being dominant
in ducks, while others are dominant in
shore birds. So, there is some evidence
that virus subtypes are not evenly distrib-
uted among all wildlife species, as would
be expected.
Another study looking at co-infec-
tions of different subtypes within a single
wild bird population is also revealing [18].
This study included several duck species,
but the population was dominated by just
three species (mallards, pintails, and blue-
winged teals), and it was studied for sev-
eral years. Mixed infections of two or
more viral subtypes were observed in
more than two out of three of the infected
birds. The frequencies of mixed infections
were compared with expected frequencies
calculated from the product of single
infections, which would indicate indepen-
dence. This analysis revealed patterns of
association among subtypes that were
markedly different compared to an expect-
ed independent, or random, association.
Co-infection with two particular subtypes
(H6N1 and H6N4), for example, occurred
355 times more frequently than would be
expected with random mixing. Another
type of mixed infection occurred 4.8 times
less frequently than random association.
Several subtypes were never isolated
alone and were always found in infections
together with one or more of the other sub-
types [19]. These deviations from expect-
ed random distributions reveal patterns in
nature that beg explanations, especially
when such deviations are so extreme
(355X). A higher than expected frequency
of positive association between two sub-
types can be interpreted as having an
advantage over single infections for both
subtypes. Conversely, negative associa-
tions may indicate a disadvantage when
two subtypes co-infect. In either case, ran-
dom mixing of influenza A subtypes in
nature appears not to be the norm. These
observed patterns in nature are important
in understanding the evolution of pandem-
ic genotypes since reassortment of genes
occurs during mixed infections [5, 6].
Understanding the evolution of poten-
tially pandemic strains in nature will be a
challenge, but investigations of influenza
A viruses in wildlife have already provid-
ed some indication of the origin of H5N1
[20]. Phylogenetic analysis of NP gene
sequences obtained from isolates of wild
ducks in the Kobyaysky area of northern
Siberia showed a sister-group relationship
with H5N1 isolates from chickens and
humans in Hong Kong in 1997. These
findings indicate that the precursor genes
of influenza viruses with pandemic poten-
tial are perpetuated in ducks nesting in
Siberia, above the arctic circle, where
avian influenza viruses are believed to sur-
vive through the winter in frozen lakes
[21].
With the seemingly permanent threat
of emergent influenza A pandemic strains
evolving from natural avian reservoir
cycles, intervention at the source clearly
deserves more serious consideration.
However, imposing changes on the natural
evolutionary processes through vaccine
intervention may have its own risks.
Antigenic drift has already been observed
to occur in response to poultry vaccination
against H5N2 in Mexico [22 ], suggesting
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genotypes may not be feasible. Also, forc-
ing changes in the natural evolution of
these viruses without a thorough under-
standing of the selection pressures and
genetic responses operating in the natural
wildlife reservoirs could result in a more
adverse outcome.
However, given that all of the known
genotypes of avian influenza viruses ulti-
mately evolve from only ducks and shore
birds, the targeted host range for a vaccine
intervention strategy involving wildlife
could involve relatively few species [5,6].
An in-depth understanding of viral evolu-
tion within and among a few key host
species could reveal fundamental processes
leading to the emergence of genotypes with
pandemic potential early enough to provide
a target that would contain those genotypes
before they become prevalent and adapt to
other species, domestic or human. Locating
key reservoir species populations and
developing an oral vaccine delivery system
would be additional problems to address.
RESEARCH PRIORITIES
REVISITED
Ecological studies of avian influenza
viruses in nature are obviously essential to
our understanding of the origin of poten-
tially pandemic strains and would provide
hope for an ability to predict the emer-
gence of human pandemics. But why have
there not been more ecological studies on
avian influenza? The answer to this ques-
tion can be revealed by examining the
research priorities for responding to
zoonotic disease threats here at home in
the U.S. In 1999, there was a West Nile
virus outbreak in New York City, just 50
miles from here (New Haven,
Connecticut). West Nile virus is another
zoonotic disease with an avian reservoir. If
we look at the NIH funding priorities for
West Nile virus for the current fiscal year,
six years after the initial outbreak, we find
that the priorities are focused upon vac-
cines, therapeutics and diagnostics (Figure
1). The basic research effort is presumably
in the same area and so are the animal
studies, which are murine (mouse) surro-
gates for studying infection in humans.
There is some funding for vector-biology
and control (less than 10 percent), but that
seems to be the limit of field studies. The
ecology of West Nile virus and the role of
birds in maintaining the virus in nature
seem not to be significant priorities. Just
as with avian influenza, the research prior-
ities for West Nile virus and other zoonot-
ic disease threats, such as Lyme disease,
should not focus primarily upon the defen-
sive posture of protecting humans from
infection. A much more aggressive, offen-
sive effort should be made to reduce
human risk of infection by intervention at
the zoonotic level of wildlife reservoirs.
Vaccination of wildlife reservoirs of
human diseases is one possibility. Other
strategies may be recognized through fur-
ther ecological studies, but this will only
happen with a serious re-evaluation of
existing research priorities for addressing
zoonotic disease threats for humans.
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